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Herd Behavior by Japanese Banks
After Financial Deregulation in the 1980s
Abstract
This paper empirically investigates whether Japanese banks followed herd behavior as
a result of financial deregulation in the 1980s, and whether any observed herd behavior
brought about ineﬃciencies that could have caused macroeconomic fluctuations. Using
loan-portfolio data, the paper examines Granger-causalities in lending behavior by diﬀer-
ent types of banks. We find that Japanese banks ineﬃciently herd from the early through
mid-1980s, the period immediately after financial deregulation began. However, contrary
to anecdotal evidence, ineﬃcient herd behavior is rarely observed in the 1990s. The herd
behavior in the 1980s was more frequently observed in lending to new borrowers than to
traditional borrowers. In addition, other banks were inclined to follow those banks that
were considered more informed in lending to a specific industry, or that were large enough
to adjust more eﬀectively to the environment created by deregulation. These results are
consistent with theoretical predictions in the literature and suggest the possibility that
the herd behavior contributed to the asset price bubble in the late 1980s.
Keywords: herd behavior; Japanese banks; financial deregulation; ineﬃciency
JEL classification number: G11; G14; G21; E44
1 Introduction
It is often argued that Japanese banks have engaged in herd behavior (yokonarabi in
Japanese). Until the late 1970s, the Japanese financial system was strictly regulated.
Capital markets were prevented to grow, and bank loans and bonds underwritten by banks
were the primary external financing source for Japanese firms. Above all, banks were
regulated explicitly and implicitly. Loan amounts, interest rates, borrowers, branching,
fees, and other business lines were controlled, and banks’ competition was discouraged to
prevent none to go bankrupt. Thus, banks were often forced to behave uniformly to keep
the relative sizes of banks stable. As the Japanese economy grew, the herd behavior was
criticized as a symbol of the ineﬃciency of the Japanese financial market. 1
Since a series of financial deregulation measures began in the 1980s, herd behavior
seems to have disappeared. Banks were gradually allowed to decide their strategies by
themselves. In addition, capital markets for major Japanese firms developed in the wake
of the huge issuance of government bonds from the late 1970s. Deregulation thus seems
to have made Japanese financial markets in general, and the lending market in particular,
more eﬃcient. 2
But, it is plausible that Japanese banks were inclined to herd even after deregulation,
because deregulation itself created structural shifts in both the demand and supply sides
of the lending market. As to the demand side, borrowers that had long-term relationships
with banks ceased to rely only on banks when raising funds in the 1980s. This is known
as the financial disintermediation. As a result, banks had to find new borrowers, such
as firms in real estate and finance industries, that they were unfamiliar with (Hoshi
and Kashyap[23]). Lacking information about their new borrowers, banks might have
herded by inferring the quality of borrowers from each other’s behavior. As for the
supply side, until deregulation, the areas in which a Japanese bank could lend were legally
segmented by type of bank, and each type had comparative advantages in its own areas.
As deregulation progressed, banks’ borrower bases gradually overlapped (Packer[35]). As
each type of bank explored new borrowers in other banks’ areas, they might have blindly
followed other types of banks that had already had advantages in the areas.
There is also a good deal anecdotal evidence of herd behavior in the lending market
1Overviews of the pre-deregulation financial system include Hoshi and Kashyap[chs 4, 5, and 6][24];
Teranishi[38]; and Kitagawa and Kurosawa[30].
2Hoshi and Kashyap[23][24, chapter 7] survey financial deregulation measures in terms of three areas:
financing, saving, and bank business lines. In particular, the financing deregulation with respect to bond
markets was implemented earlier than the other areas, due to the huge issuance of the government bonds
in the late 1970s.
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after deregulation. For example, in the 1980s, almost all banks uniformly raised the
share of their loans going to finance or real estate industries. A large percentage of non-
performing loans in the 1990s are considered to be the result of most banks not monitoring
their borrowers during the asset price bubble period of the late 1980s (Ueda[39]). Most
banks reduced loans outstanding in the 1990s, including a credit crunch (Ogawa and
Kitasaka[34]).
Consequently, even after the 1980s, there have been arguments that herd behavior by
Japanese banks remained a crucial factor that could cause macroeconomic fluctuations.
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun (NIKKEI), Japan’s leading economic newspaper, frequently
wrote about herd behavior by Japanese banks during the stagnation in the 1990s. There
was a peak of 146 articles in 1992 when it was clear that the asset bubble had burst and
the financial system faced serious consequences, while the 1980s had an average of around
20 articles a year.
However, few studies have empirically examined herd behavior by Japanese banks. In
addition, the literature has little investigated whether their behavior, if any, had macroe-
conomic impacts on the economy.
The purpose of this paper is to rectify this situation in two ways. First, we empirically
investigate whether Japanese banks followed herd behavior since the period of financial
deregulation. We focus on behavior across types of banks. This is important because
diﬀerent types of banks are likely to possess diﬀerent information about borrowers, which
may cause herding by less-informed banks drawing inferences from the behavior of banks
considered better-informed. Our empirical methodology is based on Jain and Gupta[29],
which examine Granger-causalities between lending decisions by diﬀerent types of banks
as evidence for herding.
Second, we examine whether any herd behavior identified brought about any ineﬃcient
markets equilibrium that was inconsistent with fundamental economic conditions and
could cause macroeconomic fluctuations. We test whether observed causalities can be
explained by economic variables, such as the future profitability of borrowers or structural
changes in the Japanese financial market, that may uniformly aﬀect the lending decisions
of most banks. If any causality is observed even after controlling for those factors, it may
be considered as evidence for ineﬃcient herd behavior. 3
3We do not investigate theoretical reasons for observed herd behavior and the macroeconomic impact
of herding. This is because there is no direct link between a theoretical explanation for herding and
an empirically observed herding (Bikhchandani and Sharma[8]). Moreover, it is diﬃcult to control for
underlying fundamental conditions and to distinguish spurious herding from rational herding (Alevy,
Haigh, and List[1]). For numerical or empirical analysis on the impact of herding on financial markets
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In an environment of imperfect information, herd behavior can cause an ineﬃcient
outcome. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch[6][7] establish an informational cascade
model, in which under imperfect information, rational agents infer fundamental conditions
based not only on their own private information, but also on the past record of decisions
made by their predecessors. If agents learn others that did not have enough information
of fundamental conditions, the equilibrium can be ineﬃcient. 4
However, herd behavior does not always bring about an ineﬃciency. If banks respond
to the same fundamental conditions independently and rationally, they look following
herd behavior, known as clustering or spurious herding (Hirshleifer and Teoh[21]). But
the equilibrium is socially eﬃcient. Therefore, if we refer to the macroeconomic impact
of herd behavior, it is necessary to examine whether bank herding brought about any
ineﬃciencies. 5
Our empirical results are supportive of the prediction that Japanese banks followed
herd behavior after financial deregulation. The results exhibit a time-specific feature of
herding. That is, banks followed ineﬃcient herd behavior in the early through mid-
1980s, which is immediately after the start of deregulation. In that period, the observed
herding was borrower-specific in the sense that the ineﬃcient herding was more frequently
observed in lending to new borrowers than in lending to traditional borrowers. We also
find a bank-specific feature in bank herding. That is, in the face of the uncertainty, banks
were inclined to follow the lead of banks that were considered more informed in lending
to a specific industry, or that were larger enough to adjust themselves more eﬀectively to
the new environment created by deregulation.
On balance our results suggest that deregulation created an uncertain environment
that had induced banks to ineﬃciently follow herd behavior by inferring from other banks
creditworthiness of new borrowers. This might have contributed to the asset bubble in
the late 1980s. Such behavior is rarely observed in other periods, in particular in the
1990s.
and real economy, see Bischi, Gallegati, Gardini, Leombruni, and Palestrini[5], and Welch[41].
4There are a number of theoretical studies of the various types of rational herding. Information cascade
is also analyzed by Alevy, Haigh, and List[1], Banerjee[3], and Chari and Kehoe[10]. Other studies include
herding based on pay-oﬀ externalities: bank run in Diamond and Dybvig[15], liquidity in Devenow and
Welch[14], and receipt of correlated private information in Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein[18] and Hirshleifer,
Subrahmanyam, and Titman[20]. Herding stemming from reputation concerns related to acting diﬀerently
from other managers is studied by Scharfstein and Stein[37]. Herding due to a comparative advantage in
holding securities with certain characteristics is studied by Falkenstein[17]. For surveys of herd behavior,
see Bikhchandani and Sharma[8], Chamley[11], Devenow and Welch[14], Hirshleifer and Teoh[21], and
Welch[41].
5As an example, in the asset price bubble of the late 1980s, most banks expected the surging land
prices to be sustained, so expanded lending to real estate-related industries (Ueda[39]).
3
Our empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions of studies based on
Bayesian learning frameworks. The time-specific feature of observed herding is consistent
with predictions that agents learn investment strategies from the behavior of other agents
when there was a significantly new environment, and cease to do so as they become
familiar with the environment. 6 The borrower- and bank-specific features are consistent
with the literature that shows that agents are inclined to follow informed agents when
they make investments into unfamiliar borrowers. 7
This paper is closely related to a few empirical studies about herd behavior by US
banks. Jain and Gupta[29] find that small US banks blindly replicated the lending be-
havior of large US banks in lending to developing countries from the late 1970s to the
early 1980s, when lending opportunities in the United States decreased due to economic
recession and they had to find new borrowers in other markets. The situation is quite
similar to what occurred in Japan in the 1980s. Barron and Valev[4] also find that smaller
US banks also relied on the behavior by more-informed banks from 1982 to 1994. Our
contribution compared with these papers is that, while they only examine the existence
of herd behavior, we also examine whether the observed behavior created any ineﬃciency
in the lending market.
Uchida and Nakagawa[40] investigate herd behavior by Japanese banks, focusing on
behavior within groups of banks of the same type, in contrast to our analysis focusing
on herding across types of banks. The results of these two papers are complementary.
Our results indicate that ineﬃcient herd behavior occurred across bank types in the early
through mid-1980s, while Uchida and Nakagawa find herding among the same types of
banks during the late 1980s. This successive herding (of diﬀerent forms) might have
contributed to the formation of the asset price bubble in the late 1980s. 8
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the
Japanese bank lending market and its historical transition. Section 3 conducts basic
Granger-causality tests to examine the existence of herd behavior. Section 4 examines
the eﬃciency of the herd behavior observed in Section 3. Section 5 proceeds with further
detailed analysis, sequential causality tests, to further analyze the existence and eﬃciency
6See Chamley[11], among others. Nelson[33] also shows that ineﬃcient herding gradually disappears
when underlying fundamental market conditions change over time.
7Calvo and Mendoza[12] prove that an increase in new investment opportunities stimulates investors
to herd by inferring from others’ investment activities. Menkhoﬀ, Schmidt, and Brozynski[32] show that
less experienced investors tend to exhibit a higher degree of herding.
8Note that Uchida and Nakagawa[40] use the term “irrational herd behavior.” We use the term
“ineﬃcient herd behavior” because, in our analysis using macroeconomic data, it is diﬃcult to identify
whether Japanese banks rationally followed herd behavior.
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of herd behavior. Section 6 checks the robustness of the previous results by conducting
panel VAR causality tests. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Loan Data
This section explains diﬀerent types of Japanese banks and introduces the data on their
loans outstanding by borrower. This section also describes the historical transition of
borrowers for banks to provide background for later empirical analysis. Details on data
are in the data appendix.
2.1 Bank type
We focus on four types of Japanese banks: city banks, regional banks, long-term credit
banks (hereafter LTC banks), and trust banks. City banks are the largest banks in
Japan. They have branch oﬃces in major cities and operate nationwide, as well as
internationally. Regional banks are smaller and operate in local markets. 9 LTC had
the special aim of long-term finance, while trust banks focused on trust services. Both
are often characterized as having been the main providers of long-term funds in postwar
Japan until the 1990s.
Our analysis focuses on the interaction between city banks and the other three types.
Although there was segregation of business areas in the financial industry, the scope of
business areas of city banks has been very broad and likely to overlap with the other types
of banks. It is also reasonable to focus on city banks, as they have been dominant in the
Japanese lending market. Table 1 shows that, for decades, city banks loans outstanding
have accounted for more than 40 % of total loans outstanding in Japan.
2.2 Type of borrowers
Loan data by borrower industry are available for the nine industries: Manufacturing; Con-
struction; Electricity, gas, heat supply and water (hereafter Electricity); Transport and
communication (Transport); Wholesale, retail trade, eating and drinking places (Whole-
sale); Finance and insurance (Finance); Real estate; Services; and Individuals.
Figure 1 shows the changing distribution of bank borrowing by various industries from
Japanese banks. Panel (a) — (c) show the share of loans outstanding to each borrower
industry to the total loans outstanding, and Panel (d) shows loans outstanding to each
9Regional banks are categorized into regional banks and second-tier regional banks, each with diﬀerent
historical background. However, we group them together because, when analyzed separately, the results
are similar.
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industry group. Borrower industries are in three groups based on the distinct pattern
of transitions. The first group is traditional industries (manufacturing and wholesale),
which were the dominant borrowers until the late 1970s. But their outstanding loans
have become stable during the 1980s, and their loans shares decreased from about 30%
to 15%. The second group is the emerging industries (finance, real estate, services, and
individuals) that gradually took over as the major borrowers from the mid-1980s in terms
of loans outstanding as well as loans share. The third group is status quo industries
(construction, electricity, and transport), which have marginal and stable shares during
the period.
These patterns reflect a variety of structural changes in Japan’s economy. Traditional
industries were composed of large corporations, and had been borrowing huge sums since
the World War II. However, financial deregulation from the end of the 1970s enabled
them to access other sources. As a result, their total bank borrowing became largely flat
in the mid-1980s. This shift away from direct reliance on banks is known as financial
disintermediation. 10
Deregulation helped boost of the loans outstanding and loan shares of emerging in-
dustries beginning in the early 1980s. Banks, who had lost the footing of lending to
traditional industries, had to look for new borrowers. They thus promoted loans to the
emerging industries, as their loan demand also expanded in this booming period. The
asset-price bubble of the mid- to late 1980s also contributed to the influx of funds into
the emerging industries. This is because the surge in land values made it easier for banks
to lend to unfamiliar borrowers and others using land as collateral.
Compared to the 1980s, the 1990s shows stability in the loan shares. That is, little
change is observed after the implosion of the asset price bubble in the early 1990s. In this
sense, the structural and strategic consequences of the 1980s deregulation largely played
out during the 1980s - although deregulation continued during the 1990s. Together with
the fact that the 1990s is a period of stagnation and banking crises, we expect the behavior
of Japanese banks in the 1990s to be diﬀerent from the 1980s.
Based on these observations, we examine the lending behavior of Japanese banks
to traditional industries and to emerging industries. The discussion thus far implies a
borrower-specific feature of herding. That is, herding is likely to be found in loans to
emerging industries in the 1980s, because banks needed new customers if they were to
10The deregulation includes such institutional reforms as the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Act
(December 1980) and enforcement of the New Banking Act (April 1982). The Japan-US Yen Dollar
Committee report (June 1984) was also a factor. See Hoshi and Kashyap[23][24, ch 7], Ramseyer[36] and
Campbell and Hamao[13] for more details.
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grow, but might not obtain enough information about these borrowers. In contrast, it
is less likely to find herding in loans to traditional industries, because the banks knew
these customers, and they became relatively less important borrowers. We do not analyze
the status quo industries, because the loan shares to these industries were marginal and
stabile.
3 Existence of Herd Behavior
In this section, we empirically examine whether herd behavior existed or not between city
banks and the other types of banks in the Japanese lending market.
3.1 Methodology
Our empirical methodology is to estimate two-variate vector autoregressive (VAR) models
of the loan data of city banks and of the other types of banks. We examine whether
Granger-causalities are observed between those loan variables.
We focus on four sample periods based on the historical background explained in
Section 2.2 and because of data availability: 1975:1 — 1984:4, 1980:1 — 1989:4, 1985:1 —
1994:4, and 1990:1 — 1999:4. The data observations are quarterly. The periods serially
overlap by five years in order to identify the time-variation of herd behavior under suf-
ficient degrees of freedom. The 1980-89 sample period especially enables us to examine
whether deregulation triggered herd behavior in the 1980s. 11
As a loan variable that represents the lending behavior by each type of banks to each
industry group, we use the ratio of that type of banks’ loans outstanding to the industry
group to those banks’ total loans outstanding. The size of loans outstanding is thus
normalized so that we can examine whether banks adjusted their portfolio composition
by herding. 12
Our VAR includes a constant term, seasonal dummies, and a dummy variable for the
change in the definition of the data in the second quarter of 1993.
11We do not analyze the early 1970s, because of data availability. It is also appropriate to focus on the
periods after window guidance by the Bank of Japan became less important. Until 1981, every quarter the
Bank set a plan of total loans outstanding from domestic banks, and the increase in loans was controlled
as planned. In 1982, guidance was reformed to take the form of a voluntary submission of planned lending
by individual banks, and was lifted completely in July 1991.
12We do not investigate the level of loans outstanding. Those data tend to correlate among diﬀerent
banks, and thus to generate spurious causalities more than the ratio data do, because the level data seem
to be more subject to macroeconomic trends. There is a series on New Loans for Equipment Funds by




Table 2 shows the results regarding causalities between loan ratios of city banks and those
of the other types of banks. We find three features of observed herding. 13
First, we find a time-specific feature of the results in the sense that the number of
significant causalities increases from 1975-84 to 1980-89 and then decreases from 1985-94
to 1990-99. This suggests that Japanese banks followed herd behavior most extensively in
the 1980s when deregulation started, and by the 1990s that they gradually ceased to herd.
As is explained in Section 2.2, the financial disintermediation forced most banks to switch
borrowers from traditional to new industries in the 1980s. There is a possibility that banks
followed each other’s lending behavior in order to explore new (unfamiliar) borrowers. As
banks became accustomed to the new borrowers by the 1990s, herd behavior seems to have
disappeared. On the other hand, this finding does not support the anecdotal argument
that Japanese banks followed herd behavior during the long stagnation of the 1990s.
Second, in contrast to our prediction, we do not clearly find a borrower-specific feature
of herding. Causalities are observed not only in loans to emerging industries, but also in
loans to traditional industries. This suggests financial deregulation might have induced
herding in both industry groups to a similar extent. Alternatively, herding in traditional
industries might have reflected the legacy of regulation measures until the late 1970s.
Third, we find, as a bank-specific feature of the results, that causalities are observed
mostly from LTC and trust banks to city banks in 1980-89 and 1985-94, and from city
banks to regional banks in 1980-89. The former finding suggests that city banks followed
LTC and trust banks, possibly because those banks had a comparative advantage in long-
term lending that was established during the rapid-growth era in the late 1970s. This
phenomenon may be called the Cowbell eﬀect, because of its similarity to a relationship
among Japanese banks noted by Higano[19]. 14 The latter finding implies that, in the
1980s, smaller (regional) banks followed bigger (city) banks deemed likely to have a greater
potential to adjust to the new financial environment.
In summary, Table 2 suggests that financial deregulation created a new environment
13There are several significant negative estimates of coeﬃcients that are considered to imply that the
banks compete with each other and their loans are mutually substitutes. This might be an interesting
topic, but we deter its investigation to a future work.
14Higano points out that there might have been an inducement eﬀect in loans made by the Japan
Development Bank (JDB, presently the Development Bank of Japan, a government financial institution.
He claimed that loans made by JDB signaled that the government was happy with the loans, and that the
loans ”thus were implicitly guaranteed by the government. Packer[35] argues that the LTC banks played
a similar role to JDB’s providing long-term funds to borrowers who were important in Japan’s postwar
development.
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that stimulated herd behavior among Japanese banks in the 1980s. In that period, dereg-
ulation seemed to have induced bank herding in lending to both traditional and emerging
industries, although herding in the traditional industries may also reflect regulation mea-
sures until the late 1970s. In addition, banks might have followed those types of banks
that seemed to have comparative advantages in lending to a specific industry, or that
have an ability to adjust themselves to the new environment. On the other hand, that
evidence is rarely observed in the 1990s.
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that agents tend to learn
from the behavior of other informed agents in the existence of information imperfection.
4 Ineﬃcient Herd Behavior
Next we proceed to test whether the observed causalities reflect ineﬃcient herd behavior.
As mentioned in Introduction, banks should take account of the fundamental conditions
of the economy when making lending decisions. This can induce eﬃcient herding that
is consistent with the fundamental economy. If evidence for herding is found even after
controlling for those fundamental factors, it suggests that Japanese banks might have
followed ineﬃcient herd behavior.
4.1 Methodology
The test is conducted by introducing into a VAR several macroeconomic variables.
First, the ratio of nominal GDP by industry group to aggregate nominal GDP and
the ratio of the stock price index by industry group to the TOPIX (a broad market stock
index) are used to control for changes in the relative size of loans demand by each industry
group.
Next, deregulation beginning in the 1980s accelerated disintermediation by traditional
industries. Then the ratio of total private bonds outstanding to aggregate nominal GDP
is used to control for the structural shift in loans demand by traditional industries.
In addition, the surge in land prices in the 1980s seems to have stimulated loans
demand by emerging industries because land could be used as collateral, especially in
lending to unfamiliar borrowers. Then the ratio of a nationwide land price index to
aggregate nominal GDP is used to control for changes in loans demand by emerging
industries.
One and two lags of these control variables are introduced, not only to eﬀectively
9
control for eﬃcient herding, but also to mitigate the endogenous bias problem. 15
We ensure suﬃcient degrees of freedom in the causality test by limiting the number
and the lag of control variables. Also, we do not introduce a variable that equally aﬀects
loan supply or demand of all borrowers, because such a variable is less likely to aﬀect a
bank’s portfolio composition. For example, the level of aggregate GDP, TOPIX, or call
rates do not change the loan ratio of a specific borrower. When those variables were
introduced, they were mostly insignificant in VAR estimations. Further, the amount of
non-performing loans (NPLs) in the 1990s might have had unequal eﬀects among the
loans demand of diﬀerent borrowers. However, we do not introduce it because its data
are not consistently available for our sample period. 16
4.2 Results
Table 3 shows the results regarding ineﬃcient herd behavior between city banks and the
other types of banks. Similarly to Table 2, we can observe several significant causalities
after deregulation. However, most of them become less significant.
First, we observe a slight time-specific herding in that causalities are observed most
frequently in 1980-89, but this is less remarkable than in Table 2. Hence, after the 1980s,
we cannot speculate that herd behavior generated crucial ineﬃciency in the lending market
in any specific period. Second, we do not clearly find the borrower-specific feature since
the 1980s. Significant causalities are sparse in both industry groups, except for 1975-84.
Third, the bank-specific feature is also obscure, so that the Cowbell eﬀect becomes less
significant, although causalities from city to regional banks are observed in 1980-89.
In summary, Table 3 does not indicate any significant evidence for ineﬃcient herd
behavior by Japanese banks since financial deregulation in the 1980s. This is because
most of the causalities observed in Table 2 become less significant in Table 3. At this
point, we can conclude that there might have been bank herd behavior after deregulation,
but the behavior might not have caused ineﬃciency in the lending market.
15We also conducted the analysis in which estimated expected values of macroeconomic variables were
used as control variables instead of their realized values, because expected variables can be better proxies
for those changes in loans demand than realized ones are. However, it turned out that the results were
similar. In addition, we conducted the same tests in which the lag of a VAR is fixed at four. However,
the results were not changed.
16Another reason for excluding the amount of NPLs is that it is unclear whether the amount to a
specific industry had a consistent eﬀect on new loans to that industry. On the one hand, a huge amount
of NPLs might discourage new loans; on the other hand, the NPLs might force banks to increase loans
to non-performing borrowers to prevent the remaining loans from being declared non-performing. Hoshi
and Kashyap[26] discuss this last eﬀect and survey the related literature.
10
5 Further Analysis: Sequential Causality Test
The previous section looked at four sample periods to examine herd behavior by Japanese
banks. Suﬃcient evidence of ineﬃcient herd behavior was not confirmed. A possible
reason is that bank lending behavior had been gradually changing over time, so that herd
behavior can not be identified just by testing a few specific sample periods. We therefore
investigate whether ineﬃcient herd behavior can be found in other sample periods.
For this purpose, we conduct sequential causality tests, which examine Granger-
causalities between Japanese banks for all possible ten-year sample periods. Specifically,
we select the earliest ten-year sample period from the whole sample period and examine
causalities as in the previous sections. This is repeated sequentially, shifting the sample
period by one quarter, until the end of the selected sample period reaches the end of the
whole period. The advantage of this test is that we can observe the transition of the
causalities more stringently.
5.1 Existence of Herd Behavior
Figure 2 shows the results for the existence of herd behavior between city banks and the
other types of banks. The shadowed area may indicate the existence of a robust and
long-running causality.
The figure shows several features of herding similar to those observed in Table 2. As
the time-specific feature, causalities appear most persistently in the 1980s, immediately
after deregulation began, and almost disappear by the 1990s. 17 Borrower-specific herd-
ing is not distinctly found among observed causalities in loans to either industry group.
Interestingly, the bank-specific feature is found more clearly in the 1980s in both industry
groups: the Cowbell eﬀects and regional bank herding toward city banks, implying that
banks are inclined to follow more-informed banks.
In terms of the existence of herd behavior, therefore, we confirm more clearly the
features as those in Section 3.2. We can thus conclude that financial deregulation might
have stimulated herd behavior across diﬀerent types of Japanese banks in the 1980s, while
our results seldom support the anecdotal argument that Japanese banks herded in the
1990s.
17In the late 1970s, causalities are seen only in the traditional industries, implying the lending patterns
of the high growth era until the late 1970s. Causality is also found in the 1990s from city to LTC banks
in the emerging industries. This partly supports the possibility of herding in the 1990s.
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5.2 Ineﬃcient Herd Behavior
We turn to the analysis of the eﬃciency of the observed herd behavior. Figure 3 shows
several causalities that may more clearly reflect the influence of deregulation.
First, causalities concentrate in the early through mid-1980s, and mostly disappear in
the late 1980s. Second, although the borrower-specific feature is not found in Figure 2,
in Figure 3 we find that causalities are more intensive in loans to emerging industries
after deregulation. On the other hand, most of the causalities in traditional industries
are eliminated by control variables. Third, bank-specific causalities are observed more
specifically than in Figure 2: from LTC and trust banks to city banks in the early 1980s,
and from city to regional banks in the mid-1980s.
Our results generally support our prediction that Japanese banks ineﬃciently followed
herd behavior immediately after the beginning of financial deregulation. In that period
ineﬃcient herding is observed, particularly in lending to emerging industries, possibly
because of the lack of information about those new borrowers. The ineﬃcient behavior
in the early 1980s took the form of city banks following more-informed LTC and trust
banks, and in the mid-1980s, less-informed regional banks following city banks. 18
Therefore, considering the rapid growth of loans to emerging industries in the 1980s,
herd behavior caused by deregulation might have contributed to subsequent economic
fluctuations through emerging loans by less-informed banks. This finding is similar to the
results of empirical studies about herd behavior by US banks. Jain and Gupta[29] and
Barron and Valev[4] find that small US banks relied on the lending behavior of more-
informed US banks in lending to unfamiliar developing countries in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.
On the other hand, banks might have behaved eﬃciently in the 1990s, except for LTC
banks following city banks in lending to emerging industries.
6 Robustness Check: Panel VAR Causality Test
In this section, we check the robustness of our results using another technique. In previous
sections, we focused on ten-year sample periods in order to ensure suﬃcient degrees of
freedom. However, the sample period might be so long that includes structural changes
18As to delayed herding, Chari and Kehoe[10] establish a cascade model in which investors delay invest-
ment in order to gain information and start herding when waiting becomes costly due to discounting. Also,
Barron and Valev[4] establish a model that smaller banks endowed with insuﬃcient wealth are more likely
to not gather costly information on investment prospects, and to rely on the behavior of more-informed
banks with some delay to infer information about international investment prospects.
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in the economy. We thus check causalities under a shorter sample period by estimating
panel vector autoregression models (panel VAR).
6.1 Methodology
Panel VAR estimation is to estimate a VAR with panel data. Here, in order to test
causalities between loan ratios of two bank types in an industry group, the panel VAR
fixed-eﬀect model is expressed as:














i = 1, · · · ,N, t = 1, · · · , T.
xi,t is the loan ratio of bank type x to industry i in period t, and yi,t is the loan ratio of
bank type y to the same in dustry in the same period. ui,t and vi,t are i.i.d. error terms.
α1,i and α2,i are the vectors of deterministic or exogenous components that represent fixed
eﬀects in each industry of the group. β1,k,β2,k, γ1,k and γ2,k are the coeﬃcients of the
loan ratios. m is the number of the lag of the panel VAR. N is the number of industries
in the group. T is the number of observations of the loan ratio to each industry.
Panel VAR estimation is diﬀerent from standard VAR in that the number of total
observations of the industry group is increased from T to N × T . For example, in the
standard causality test for the traditional industries during 1980:1 — 1989:4, the number of
observations of the loan ratio is 40 (T = 4×10), because the loan ratio is calculated using
the sum of loans outstanding to manufacturing and wholesale industries. In the panel
VAR causality test for the same data, the number of observations is 80 (N ×T = 2× 40),
because the loan ratio is calculated using individually the loans outstanding to those
industries. As a result, we can ensure suﬃcient degrees of freedom in the test even if we
examine a short period.
We focus on the following five-year periods: 1975:1 — 1979:4, 1980:1 — 1984:4, 1985:1 —
1989:4, 1990:1 — 1994:4, and 1995:1 — 1999:4. We estimate a panel VAR using generalized
least square (GLS), considering the heteroscedasticity of the loan ratio by industry. In
addition, loan ratios are normalized by dividing them with their own sample means. Other
details of the panel VAR causality test are the same as previous tests. 19
19The optimal lag of the panel VAR is determined based on SBIC. Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen[22]
emphasize the importance of the selection of the optimal lag in the panel VAR estimation. SBIC has
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6.2 Existence of Herd Behavior
Table 4 shows the results of panel causality tests for the existence of herd behavior. The
table shows that causalities are found most frequently in 1980-84 and 1985-89. This
implies that financial deregulation stimulated herd behavior by Japanese banks in the
1980s. A few causalities are also found in the 1990s, although they are not prevalent
among Japanese banks.
Again, we do not clearly find the borrower-specific feature. That is, herding was
no more intensive in lending to emerging industries. As for the banks-specific feature,
we can confirm that regional banks often followed city banks. On the other hand, city,
LTC, and trust banks seem to have followed each other. Those banks might have been
interdependent in shorter periods.
In summary, the panel causality tests reinforce the previous results that Japanese
banks followed herd behavior in facing deregulation in the 1980s. But features regarding
borrowers or bank types are not clearly obtained to the extent that is consistent with the
results in previous sections.
6.3 Ineﬃcient Herd Behavior
We now proceed to panel VAR causality tests for the eﬃciency of the observed herd
behavior. The variables to control for eﬃciency are the same as the macroeconomic
variables used earlier. Note, however, that in the panel causality test, a diﬀerent control
variable is chosen for each industry of an industry group, while in the standard causality
test a control variable is applied for each industry group. In this sense, the eﬃciency of
herd behavior can be controlled more eﬀectively in this panel test.
Table 5 shows the results for ineﬃcient herd behavior. We find the time-specific
feature that causalities are most frequently observed in the early 1980s. The borrower-
specific feature is not clearly observed in the 1980s, because causalities are found in the
traditional industries as well as in the emerging industries. Again, causalities in the
traditional industries might reflect not only the eﬀect of deregulation, but also eﬀects of
past regulation measures.
Finally, the results in the 1980s suggest the bank-specific feature. The Cowbell eﬀect
is often found from LTC and trust banks to city banks, although reverse causalities are
partly found. In contrast to the previous analysis, causalities from city banks to regional
bank are not clearly observed in the 1980s. However, if we examine the mid-1980s (1983:1
been commonly used to determine the optimal lag, according to Larsson, Lyhagen, and Lothgren[31] and
Ericsson and Irandoust[16].
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— 1987:4), when those causalities are found in Figure 3, we confirm the same causalities
in both industry groups (Panel (f) of Table 5).
In summary, the main results are consistent with the results from sequential causality
testing, in that Japanese banks, the less-informed in particular, displayed ineﬃcient herd
behavior in the early 1980s, the beginning period of deregulation. 20
7 Conclusion
This paper has examined empirically whether Japanese banks followed herd behavior
after financial deregulation started in the early 1980s, and whether observed herding had
brought about ineﬃcient outcomes that could have led to subsequent macroeconomic
fluctuations.
The perceived herd behavior of Japanese banks is considered a symbol of ineﬃcient
Japanese financial markets. Even though the behavior seems to have disappeared because
of deregulation, there has been much anecdotal evidence for herd behavior by banks, which
has been blamed for economic problems in the 1990s.
Our empirical results suggest that Japanese banks ineﬃciently herded in the early
through mid-1980s, immediately after the beginning of deregulation. In that period, the
ineﬃcient behavior seems to have been more significant in lending to new borrowers that
banks had not been familiar with than in lending to traditional borrowers. In addition,
banks seem to have followed those banks more informed in lending to a specific industry.
These results are consistent with theoretical predictions in the literature, and suggest the
possibility that ineﬃcient herding might have had contributed to formation of the asset
price bubble in the late 1980s. On the other hand, the results do not support anecdotal
evidence that Japanese banks followed ineﬃcient herd behavior in the 1990s.
There are two important issues that are unchallenged in this paper. First, we do not
empirically investigate whether and how ineﬃcient herding contributed to formation of
the asset price bubble in the late 1980s and the accumulation of non-performing loans in
the 1990s. Second, we focus sorely on the question of whether observed herd behavior
was eﬃcient, not on identifying any theoretical causes of observed herding. Those issues
are to be clarified in a separate study.
20Other causalities are observed in the late 1990s. This suggests that ineﬃcient herding occurred after




All the data used in this paper are available from Nikkei NEEDS Macroeconomic Data
File. The original sources are shown below.
Loans Outstanding
Loan data are available from “Loans and Discounts Outstanding by Sector” in the Finan-
cial and Economic Statistics Monthly of the Bank of Japan. The data include the amount
of loans supplied to diﬀerent industries by type of bank. Data for trust bank lending to
the finance and insurance industries are available only from the first quarter of 1977. No
data for LTC and trust banks are available from the fourth quarter of 2000.
The types of banks and their loans outstanding are defined as follows. First, regional
and second-tier regional banks are combined as regional banks. Second, the loans out-
standing of trust banks are defined as Banking Accounts of Trust Banks + Trust Accounts
of Domestically Licensed Banks. The latter includes loans outstanding in the trust ac-
counts of all Domestically Licensed Banks - that is, trust banks and the other types of
banks - and the total cannot be separated between trust banks and other banks. However,
the amount held by non-trust banks is negligible compared to the amount held by trust
banks.
GDP
GDP data are available from the Annual Report on National Accounts prepared by the
Cabinet Oﬃce. We utilize nominal data from 68SNA (original series, at market prices in
calendar 1990) for the years until 1979, and from 93SNA (original series, at market prices
in calendar 1995) for the years from 1980. The data include aggregate nominal GDP and
nominal GDP by industry.
Although the industry classification is almost the same as that of the loan data, there
are no nominal GDP data for Individuals. Real estate GDP is used as a proxy for the
GDP of Individuals. Nominal GDP by industry is available only on annual basis, so we
establish its quarterly data by interpolating the original data.
In the simple and sequential causality tests, nominal GDP by industry group is calcu-
lated as the sum of the nominal GDPs of the industries that are included in the relevant
industry group. For example, the nominal GDP of the traditional industries is calculated
as the sum of the nominal GDPs of Manufacturing and Wholesale industries. In the panel
VAR causality tests (Section 6.3), the nominal GDP by industry is directly used.
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Stock Price Index
Stock price data are available from the Monthly Statistics Report from the Tokyo Stock
Exchange. The data include TOPIX and TOPIX Stock Price Index by Industry.
The industry classification is slightly diﬀerent from that of the loan data. Therefore,
the most closely related stock price index by industry is chosen as a proxy for the index for
the relevant industry group or the industry itself. In the simple and sequential causality
tests, the Electric Appliances Index is applied for traditional industries, and the Real
Estate Index is used for emerging industries. In the panel causality tests, the Electric
Appliances Index is used for the Manufacturing industry, the Wholesale Trade Index for
Wholesale, the Banks Index for Finance, the Real Estate Index for Real estate, and the
Services Index for Services. There is no index for Individuals, so the Real Estate Index
is used.
The Wholesale and Banks Indexes are not available until 1982. Then in the analy-
sis which uses data prior to 1982, the Machinery and Real Estate Indexes are used for
Wholesale and Finance, respectively. The Machinery Index is chosen because it is the
most-correlated with the Wholesale Index of all indexes regarding traditional industries
during 1983 — 99. The Real Estate Index is the most-correlated with the Banks Index of
all indexes regarding emerging industries during 1983 — 99.
Other Data
Bond data are available from the Annual Report of the Japan Securities Dealers Associ-
ation. The data include Total Private Bonds Outstanding, which is used to establish the
proxy for disintermediation.
Land price data are available from the Japan Real Estate Institute. The data includes
the Nationwide Urban Land Price Index, which is used to establish the proxy for the
collateral value of loans to emerging industries.
Each of the above control variables is used not only for an industry group in simple
and sequential causality tests, but also for every industry of an industry group in the
panel VAR causality tests.
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Table 1 Loan Shares of Different Types of Japanese Banks
City Regional LTC Trust
1975 112,502 42.0 34.7 9.8 13.5
1976 125,303 41.6 35.0 9.8 13.6
1977 137,120 41.2 35.5 9.8 13.5
1978 151,197 40.9 36.4 9.6 13.1
1979 161,598 40.6 36.8 9.6 13.0
1980 173,260 40.5 37.1 9.5 12.9
1981 190,276 40.5 37.2 9.6 12.7
1982 208,917 40.5 37.2 9.7 12.6
1983 228,694 40.7 36.9 9.7 12.7
1984 250,826 41.0 36.2 9.8 13.0
1985 275,141 41.5 35.2 10.2 13.1
1986 298,130 42.4 33.6 10.0 14.0
1987 326,613 42.8 33.4 10.3 13.4
1988 350,105 42.8 33.9 10.3 13.0
1989 384,625 42.6 34.2 10.4 12.8
1990 408,791 42.4 34.3 10.6 12.7
1991 421,083 42.0 34.5 10.7 12.8
1992 427,972 41.8 34.7 10.5 13.0
1993 511,018 43.9 35.3 9.3 11.5
1994 508,850 43.5 36.1 9.2 11.3
1995 512,747 42.5 36.9 9.3 11.3
1996 512,060 42.4 37.3 9.2 11.1
1997 513,748 43.0 37.6 8.8 10.6
1998 502,902 43.5 38.6 8.2 9.7
1999 482,246 44.5 39.0 7.0 9.5





Loan share of each bank type (%)
Table 2   Causality Tests regarding Existence of Herd Behavior
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.154*** -0.096 4 -0.080 -0.095
LTC 2 0.138** 0.078 2 0.008 -0.022
Trust 4 0.312*** 0.056
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 -0.365 0.402*** 1 -0.612 0.366***
LTC 1 0.067*** -0.066 1 0.085*** -0.052
Trust 1 0.094*** -0.104 3 0.127*** -0.081
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.228 -0.004 1 0.030 0.028
LTC 1 0.353*** -0.044 3 0.336** 0.171
Trust 2 0.123** -0.049 1 0.249*** -0.199
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 -0.065 -0.027 1 -0.012 0.018
LTC 3 -0.162 0.068 1 -0.096 -0.246
Trust 1 0.059 -0.056 1 0.070 -0.116
Note: This table shows the results regarding causalities between loan ratios of city
banks and those of the other types of banks in individual industry groups. The rows
of each panel show the types of banks whose relationships with city banks are being
investigated. Two columns show the industry groups as borrowers. " Lag "
represents the optimal lag of a VAR, which is determined based on SBIC. " => City
" represents a causality from the relevant type of banks to city banks. " City => " is
the reverse causality. Each value is an estimated sum of the coefficients of the loan
ratio of the type of banks that is an explanatory variable in the VAR. The
superscript *** means that the sum of coefficients is positive and significant at 1%
level in an F-test; ** at 5%; * at 10%. Results regarding trust banks for 1975-84 are
not available because of a lack of data.
Traditional Emerging
Emerging
(c) 1985:1 -- 1994:4
Traditional
Traditional
(a) 1975:1 -- 1984:4
Traditional Emerging
(d) 1990:1 -- 1999:4
Emerging
(b) 1980:1 -- 1989:4
N.A.
Table 3   Causality Tests regarding Inefficient Herd Behavior
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.192** -0.142 2 -0.106 -0.013
LTC 2 0.147* 0.020 1 0.197*** -0.511
Trust 2 0.222** -0.014
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.185 0.292** 1 0.214 0.46***
LTC 1 0.075 -0.074 1 0.079 -0.165
Trust 1 0.108* -0.215 1 0.233* -0.340
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.105 0.080 2 0.103 -0.017
LTC 1 0.168 0.002 2 0.318** 0.45**
Trust 2 0.004 -0.083 1 0.160 -0.098
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.534* 0.063 3 -0.090 -0.346
LTC 3 -0.356 0.045 1 -0.121 0.131
Trust 2 0.022 0.069 1 0.037 -0.197
Emerging
Emerging
(c) 1985:1 -- 1994:4
Traditional
Note: This table shows the results regarding causalities between loan ratios of city
banks and those of the other types of banks in individual industry groups, with one
and two lagged macroeconomic variables. Other detail is seen in Table 2.
(d) 1990:1 -- 1999:4
Traditional
Traditional Emerging
(a) 1975:1 -- 1984:4
Traditional Emerging
(b) 1980:1 -- 1989:4
N.A.
Table 4   Panel VAR Causality Tests regarding Existence of Herd Behavior
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.287*** -0.261 1 -0.079 0.251***
LTC 2 0.013 0.257** 1 -0.021 0.059
Trust 2 0.022 0.183*
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.177 0.131* 1 0.160*** -0.011
LTC 1 0.054* 0.168** 2 -0.012 0.056
Trust 1 0.071** 0.476*** 1 0.002 0.028
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.107 0.135** 1 -0.084 -0.001
LTC 1 0.035 -0.041 1 -0.073 0.036**
Trust 1 0.330*** -0.185 2 -0.075 0.006
Emerging
(c) 1985:1 -- 1989:4
Traditional
Traditional Emerging
(a) 1975:1 -- 1979:4
Traditional Emerging
(b) 1980:1 -- 1984:4
N.A.
(Table 4   continued)
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.160 0.112 1 -0.064 0.080*
LTC 1 -0.050 -0.176 1 -0.066 -0.019
Trust 1 -0.086 -0.243 1 -0.165 0.052**
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 -0.077 -0.053 2 -0.090 .073***
LTC 3 -0.040 0.286** 2 0.019 0.043
Trust 1 0.005 -0.189 2 -0.031 -0.045
(d) 1990:1 -- 1994:4
Note: This table shows the results of panel VAR causality tests between loan ratios
of city banks and those of the other types of banks in individual industry groups,
without macroeconomic variables. Each value is an estimated sum of the fixed-
effect coefficients of the loan ratio of the type of banks that is an explanatory
variable in the panel VAR. The generalized least square estimation is applied,
considering heteroscedasticity of the loan ratio by industry. Loan ratios are
normaliezed by dividing them with their own sample means. Other detail is seen in
Table 2.
(e) 1995:1 -- 1999:4
Traditional Emerging
Traditional Emerging
Table 5   Panel VAR Causality Tests regarding Inefficient Herd Behavior
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.273*** -0.463 1 0.060 0.141
LTC 1 0.032 1.168*** 1 0.187*** -0.153
Trust 2 0.089** 0.405***
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 2 0.306 0.770*** 3 0.516*** 0.067
LTC 2 0.064* 0.491*** 1 0.120* 0.142
Trust 1 0.116*** 0.458* 1 0.130*** 0.071
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.355 0.254* 1 0.082 -0.013
LTC 1 0.226* 0.100 1 0.006 0.163***
Trust 1 0.468*** -0.207 1 -0.042 0.023
(a) 1975:1 -- 1979:4
Traditional Emerging
(c) 1985:1 -- 1989:4




(Table 5   continued)
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 -0.471 -0.013 1 -0.237 0.268**
LTC 1 -0.246 -0.022 1 -0.158 -0.439
Trust 1 -0.089 -0.334 1 -0.172 -0.063
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 2 0.082 -0.082 1 0.178 0.095
LTC 3 0.005 1.374*** 2 0.960 -0.368
Trust 2 -0.125 0.526*** 2 0.030 -0.179
Lag => City City => Lag => City City =>
Regional 1 0.098 0.284** 3 0.211 0.383***
LTC 1 0.029 0.373* 1 0.046 0.036
Trust 1 0.103* 0.349** 1 0.145 0.057
(d) 1990:1 -- 1994:4
(f) 1983:1 -- 1987:4
Traditional Emerging
(e) 1995:1 -- 1999:4
Note: This table shows the results of panel VAR causality tests between loan ratios
of city banks and those of the other types of banks in individual industry groups,
with one and two lagged macroeconomic variables. Loan ratios and macro variables





































































































































































































































































































































































Note: A jump in the second quarter of 1993 reflects changes in the definition of the data.











Note: This figure shows the results regarding sequential causality tests between loan ratios of city banks and those
of the other types of banks in individual industry groups, without macroeconomic variables. The rows are the types
of banks (except for city banks). The columns are the industry groups as borrowers. In each panel, " => City "
represents a causality from the relevant type of banks to city banks. " City => " is the reverse causality. The
horizontal axis is the median of each sumple period (e.g., the results at "1982:1'' represent the results of the sample
period "1977:1 -- 1986:4''). The data from 1970:1 to 1999:4 are used to obtain results for 1975:1 ("1970:1 --
1979:4'') through 1995:1 ("1990:1 -- 1999:4''). The solid line is an estimated sum of the coefficients of the loan ratio
of the type of banks that is an explanatory variable in the VAR. The dark and light shadows represent that the sum
of the coefficients is significant at 1% and 5% level in an F-test, respectively. The optimal lag of a VAR is
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Note: This figure shows the results of sequential causality tests between loan ratios of city banks and those of the
other types of banks in individual industry groups, with one and two lagged macro variables. The black line is an
estimated sum of the coefficients of the loan ratio of the type of banks that is an explanatory variable in the VAR.
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